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Monday 26th of May 2026

POLICE REPRESENTATION

Section 53A of the Licensing Act 2003 – Summary Licence Review, Premises Review Report

SELBY COMMUNITY CENTRE, 1 SELBY ROAD, LONDON, N17 8JL

Premises License Number: **LN/00002506 & LN/000003257**

Issued 1st MARCH 2006, last DPS Variation on the 8th of DECEMBER 2025.

Review Hearing 1st JUNE 2026

Summary Review / Full Review Evidence

Premises	Selby Community Centre
Premises Address	1 Selby Road, London, N17 8JL
Premises Licence Number(s)	LN/00002506 and LN/000003257
Licensing Authority	London Borough of Haringey
Police Licensing Officer	Police Constable Adriana Costache
Review Hearing Date	1 st JUNE 2026
Police Position	Revocation sought; alternatively stringent conditions
Document Status	Police Representation and completion of service chronology

1. Introduction and Police Authority

I am PC Adriana Costache employed as a central licensing officer. I am currently attached to Edmonton Police Station, part of Strategic Delivery Unit Sector 1, dealing with North Area, Northwest and West Area. I initially joined this role on the 6th of JANUARY 2025 as a borough licensing officer, and I have been working for the London Metropolitan Police since 17th SEPTEMBER 2018 in different roles and police stations.

This representation is submitted on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service in respect of the premises known as Selby Community Centre, 1 Selby Road, London, N17 8JL.

This document is prepared for the full review hearing following the summary review process initiated under section 53A of the Licensing Act 2003.

2. Premises Details

Selby Centre is a large community centre which is a repurposed old school building and is now used as a venue for multiple community events. Selby Centre is located at the end of Selby Road which is a dead end; there is a red fence and a gate around the entrance/exit. There is a large carpark directly ahead of the gate entrance, situated outside of the main building/reception building. To the right as you enter the estate there is a smaller car park outside a second building opposite the main building which is surrounded by a fence and backs onto an additional recreational building. This is where a shooting took place on Friday 1st of May 2026. The premises are situated on an industrial estate and have been operating since 1st March 2006. Licensable activities authorized by the Licence:

Supply of Alcohol

Provision of Late-Night Refreshment

Regulated Entertainment: Plays, Films, Indoor Sporting Events, Boxing or Wrestling Entertainments, Live Music, Recorded Music, Provision of Facilities for Making Music & Dancing

The times the Licence authorises the carrying out of licensable activities:

Supply of Alcohol

Monday to Thursday	11:00 to 22:30
Friday & Saturday	12:00 to 01:30
Sunday	12:00 to 11:30

Provision of Late-Night Refreshment

Friday & Saturday	23:00 to 02:00
Sunday	23:00 to 00:00

Regulated Entertainment

Monday to Thursday	11:00 to 23:00
Friday & Saturday	12:00 to 02:00
Sunday	12:00 to 00:00

The opening hours of the premises:

Monday to Thursday	09:00 to 23:00
Friday & Saturday	09:00 to 02:00
Sunday	09:00 to 00:00

Where the Licence authorises supplies of alcohol whether these are on and/or off supplies:

Supply of alcohol for consumption **ON** the premises.

The premises Licence Holder registered is Selby Trust and starting with 8th December 2025 Mrs Unique West- Alese was appointed as a Designated Premises Supervisor at the premises.

3. Purpose of the Review

On Friday 1st of MAY 2026, there was an event with a screening of a boxing match at the community centre on the evening of the incident. This review has been brought in relation to a serious incident which occurred at the boxing event associated with the premises involving reports of gunshots, a firearm being seen, persons leaving the location in vehicles, blood being found at the scene, multiple cartridge casings being recovered, a possible ballistic strike to a vehicle, ammunition being recovered and a linked male presenting at hospital with injuries who stated that he had been at the Selby Centre watching the boxing.

When response officers attended the hospital, the victim had visible injuries to his left-hand thumb along with a puncture wound on the left top hand appeared to be a gunshot wound. Whilst in hospital the victim was found with an additional injury of 2 inches to penis near groin area. To sum up the victim's injuries were a gunshot wound to top part of left hand (center), 1-inch-deep slash wound to left hand thumb, 2x 1 inch slash wound to left side of pelvis, 1x 2 inches slash wound across penis near groin. The victim was unhelpful to Police being unwilling to provide many details. A charge nurse at North Middlesex Hospital stated to Police that the victim had told her that he had been at a gathering at the Selby Centre but then refused to engage further.

On TUESDAY 5th of MAY 2026 about 14.06hrs as a result of the serious incident at the Selby Centre from previous week, licensing officer visited the premises and spoke to DPS and CEO of SELBY TRUST. They both stated that none of them was present during the incident on FRIDAY 1st of MAY 2026, and they were unable to offer much information about what happened. They said they are not doing any checks as GALA handles the bookings. DPS stated they offer 4 SIA security for each event and sometimes more are brought on site by third party, that it was one off incident and she emailed the licensing officer a catalogue of upcoming May events, including dates, expected attendance, and the nature of each event (please see Annex 1 part A). DPS and CEO they brought a male who was introduced to the licensing officer as the head of security who also stated that he was not present at the time of the incident, but he arrived 15 minutes later.

The head of security mentioned a team leader security who was present on the day of the incident. He said he was called by the team leader security regarding the shooting at about 22:28 hrs. but that does not align exactly with the CCTV footage as the timings appear out by approximately 30 minutes.

Police Licensing officer viewed the footage that shows various vehicles coming in and out through the gates. At approximately 2249 hrs. a silver vehicle drives though the main gates at a speed, passing by

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three (3) SIA security who were standing by the gates, the vehicle turns into the right-hand side of the car park. The Driver and the passenger are seen exiting the vehicle and several muzzle flashes are seen on CCTV as it appears a firearm is discharged. Security personnel wearing high-vis jackets are seen in the footage standing at the gates inside the car park to scatter and run upon hearing the gunshots. Members of the public and security duck for cover at the same time and run away from direction of the shots. A short time passes where no security personnel can be seen whereupon after approximately a minute patrons from the event can be seen arriving at the scene and discovering the victim near a parked van in the car park whereby they rendered aid.

There is no scene preservation, no visible risk assessment put in place to protect the public etc. which raises concerns.

When enquiries were asked of security regarding how they gauge attending numbers of patrons they confirmed that they had no means of counting attendees and in any event estimated there were less than 100 attendees so didn't see the necessity for it.

Police ascertained that the event was rented by a company called GALA. The Manager of Gala explained that he generally accepted bookings from another third party for the facilities without checking on who he will sublet the facilities to. Essentially these premises are sublet twice.

Friday's event, he said it was a boxing event organized by a third party. He stated that the venue's capacity is 350, but it was hired for 100 people. He said he relies on the Selby Trust's SIA security staff and do not hire their own security. He admitted he could not tell if people brought their own alcohol and that no searching was done. The person in charge of GALA also said there were children under 18 with their parents present at the boxing event.

In conclusion, those responsible for the premises were unable to account for events or provide accurate details, responsibility appeared to be delegated between multiple parties, with no clear control. This points to a serious absence of effective management and oversight, with Inadequate Security Measures, security staff did not conduct searches of attendees, there was no control over items brought into the premises, including potential weapons, no accurate capacity management system was in place, the security admitted there was no use of clickers, however they estimate 100 people inside the venue, but were unable to verify. CCTV timelines did not align with accounts provided by staff, undermining credibility, poor Event Management and Booking Practices by GALA who accepted bookings without due diligence or background checks. The event in question was organised by a third party with no vetting process, and no risk assessment conducted. The venue operator relied solely on existing in-house SIA staff without reviewing adequacy, and the venue admitted that there was no monitoring of alcohol being brought onto premises, there was no clarity on licensable activities occurring during the event and a lack of control significantly increased the risk of disorder. It has been confirmed that children under 18 were present at the event, this occurred despite, violent in an unmanaged environment with no effective safeguarding or risk assessment. This represents a failure to uphold the objective of protecting children from harm. This incident is not isolated, on the 9 April 2026, police received five separate calls reporting a fight at the venue involving approximately 50 individuals, with objects being thrown, and a knife sighting, this demonstrates an ongoing pattern of disorder, violence, and Poor control of events. Moreover, the Officer in Charge of the investigation has confirmed that the victim of the shooting is associated with a local gang; this significantly heightens the risk of retaliatory violence, and further serious incidents linked to the premises. Police assess there to be a high likelihood of recurrence unless decisive action is taken. The current operation of the premises is fundamentally undermining the

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following objectives, Prevention of Crime and Disorder, which has seen a Firearms discharged on site, serious violence including stabbing and shooting, and a lack of controls enabling criminal activity. Patrons have been exposed to extreme violence; there are no adequate risk management or emergency response coordination, no consideration for the Protection of Children from Harm, there were children present during a violent firearms incident with no safeguarding measures in place. The current Premises Licence is, in police view, no longer fit for purposes. Overall, the police have no confidence that the current management has the competence, capability, or commitment necessary to operate the premises in a manner that upholds the licensing objectives.

4. Police Position & History of the premises:

The police position is that revocation is appropriate and proportionate because the premises has been associated with serious crime and serious disorder, including a firearms incident involving multiple reports of shots, vehicle movements, a hospital-linked injured male, blood at the scene, multiple cartridge casings, possible ballistic damage and recovered ammunition.

Police acknowledge that revocation is a significant step. However, the licensing regime is preventative and protective. This review is not brought as a punishment, but to protect the public and uphold the licensing objectives.

On 6th of MAY 2026 about 13.55 hrs., PC COSTACHE informed the Local Authority about the Review application (please see Annex 2 part A) for Selby Community Centre and the reasons and it was sent over together with the Certificate under Section 53A(1) (b) of the Licensing Act 2003 signed by Detective Superintendent Marco BARDETTI (please see Annex 3 part A). Both documents have been served to the premises in the same day about 15.00 hrs, namely to the DPS in the presence of the CEO of the company as per my MG11 statement. (please see Annex 4-part A)

Trigger Incident: 1 May 2026

The incident on 1 May 2026 is the trigger incident giving rise to this summary review. The evidence is not reliant on a single source. The initial report came from the head of security at the Selby Centre. That report was supported by an independent member of the public who heard six to eight gunshots, and by an off-duty police officer who heard four “pops” and saw vehicles leaving the Selby Centre.

The linked CAD evidence is further supported by the hospital attendance of an injured male who stated that he had been at the Selby Centre, a blood trail found by a police blood dog, the recovery of multiple cartridge casings, CCTV enquiries, a possible bullet strike to a van window and the recovery of ammunition.

Annex 5 -part B – CAD 10169/01MAY 2026 created at 2313Hours 1st May 2026

Nurse from North Middlesex Hospital stated to police who attended the Hospital on an enquiry that a male who attended with gunshot injuries upon speaking to him stated to her that he was “at a gathering at the Selby Centre” but wouldn’t say much more than that.

Annex 6-part B- CAD 10167/01MAY26

CAD 10167/01MAY26 created at 23:08 hours on 1 May 2026.

This CAD records information from a witness recorded as an off-duty police officer. The witness reported hearing four “pops” at approximately 22:52 hours near the Selby Centre and then seeing four vehicles drive away from the location.

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The vehicles described included a white Vauxhall Corsa, a silver Toyota Prius, a white BMW 1 Series and a grey Audi saloon believed to look like an Audi A4.

The witness described the vehicles leaving the Selby Centre southbound towards Creighton Road and then eastbound towards the High Road. The CAD was explicitly linked to CAD 10074/01MAY26.

Police submit that this CAD provides further independent corroboration of the timing, location and vehicle movements associated with the incident.

Annex 7-part B - CAD 10074/01MAY26

CAD 10074/01MAY26 created at 23:02 hours on 1 May 2026 following an emergency call from the head of security at the Selby Centre.

The initial report stated that security staff had witnessed a gunshot, that a gun had been seen and heard, and that males were leaving in vehicles. The incident was opened as a firearms incident and firearm discharged incident.

The CAD identified a silver Toyota Prius as a vehicle of interest. The CAD later recorded information that a male had taken a gun out of a window and that the victim had been shot in the leg. The CAD also recorded that the shot was believed to have come from the Toyota Prius.

Officers were tasked to attend North Middlesex Hospital to check whether anyone had been presented with gunshot injuries. The CAD later recorded that a male was at hospital with a stab wound to the left thigh and that the male stated he had been at the Selby Centre.

The CAD records that a blood dog found a blood trail, that officers believed they had located a bullet casing, and that further blood was located. CCTV was later reviewed and the CAD recorded that six to eight casings had been found. The scene was then extended after eleven casings were found outside the fenced area where the vehicle had been parked.

The CAD further recorded that a van in the car park appeared to have a bullet hole in a window and potentially ballistic material inside. Later updates recorded that scene photography had been completed and that a magazine containing rounds of ammunition had been recovered.

Police submit that CAD 10074 provides compelling evidence of a serious firearms incident linked to the Selby Centre, involving suspected firearm discharge, injury, blood at the scene, multiple cartridge casings, possible ballistic damage to a vehicle and recovered ammunition.

Annex 8 -part B - CAD 10050/01MAY26

CAD 10050/01MAY26 created at 23:00 hours on 1 May 2026 following an emergency call from an independent member of the public in the Queen Street / N17 area.

The caller reported hearing six to eight gunshots approximately ten minutes earlier. The caller stated that the sounds were loud, consistent, approximately two to three seconds apart, and did not sound like fireworks.

This CAD was explicitly linked to CAD 10074/01MAY26. Police submit that this CAD provides independent corroboration that multiple shots were heard in the area at the relevant time.

5. Previous Linked Incident: 9 April 2026

Police checks identified a previous significant disorder incident outside the Selby Centre on 9 April 2026, approximately three weeks before the firearms incident that led to this review.

This incident generated multiple linked emergency CADs, including CAD 8583/09APR26, CAD 8587/09APR26, CAD 8606/09APR26, CAD 8650/09APR26 and CAD 8621/09APR26.

Police submit that these CADs should be considered together as a linked incident, rather than as separate isolated events. They show multiple members of the public contacting police within a short period of time, all reporting serious disorder in or around the Selby Centre.

Annex 9 – part B - CAD 8650/09APR26

CAD 8650/09APR26 created at approximately 22:24 hours.

The caller reported people fighting in the park at the Selby Centre and stated that it was unknown whether weapons or injuries were involved. The caller requested a Turkish translator and was described as panicked. Police were already on scene by later updates.

Annex 10 – part B - CAD 8621/09APR26

CAD 8621/09APR26 created at approximately 22:23 hours.

This CAD recorded a report of a group of approximately 15 persons outside the Selby Centre who appeared as if they may have weapons. The caller stated that they were worried the group were coming to attack a wedding, that threats had been made to use weapons to cause harm, and that some male guests had gone outside.

This CAD was explicitly linked to CAD 8583 and implicitly linked to the other CADs concerning the same incident.

Annex 11 – part B - CAD 8606/09APR26

CAD 8606/09APR26 created at approximately 22:20 hours and was linked to the same incident.

The caller reported a “huge fight” involving approximately 50 youths, with lots of hitting and kicking. The caller also reported that some people were on the floor and that items were being thrown away.

No weapons were seen by that caller, but the incident was assessed as involving physical harm, ongoing risk and youth-related disorder.

Annex 12 – part B - CAD 8583/09APR26

CAD 8583/09APR26 created at approximately 22:18 hours following an emergency call reporting males fighting outside the Selby Centre.

The caller reported approximately 15 males fighting outside the premises. The CAD was opened as violence against the person and was graded for immediate police response.

Further updates recorded that males were throwing objects at each other, possibly stones, and that vehicles were being hit. London Ambulance Service was also contacted because the incident involved a large fight, and injuries were unclear at that stage.

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The CAD was later closed with no confirmed offences disclosed and no confirmed injuries. Police submit that it remains relevant because it demonstrates significant disorder, public fear, possible injury risk and the need for emergency service attendance at or immediately outside the premises.

Annex 13 – part B - CAD 8587/09APR26

CAD 8587/09APR26 created at approximately 22:18 hours and was linked to CAD 8583.

This CAD recorded reports of guns being heard or “guns going off” and a male being seen with a large knife. The caller reported that people were fighting and that one male was on the floor with another male on top of him. The caller believed one person may have been holding a knife.

The CAD later records that the caller reported hearing two shots before calling police and seeing a knife but did not see a firearm. The caller also reported people leaving the area along Selby Road.

Police submit that this CAD is highly relevant because, three weeks before the firearms incident, police had already received reports linked to the Selby Centre involving fighting, a large knife, possibly gunshots and people on the floor.

6. Police assessment of the 9 April incident

Police acknowledge that officers later recorded that no offences or injuries were confirmed at that time. However, the incident remains highly relevant for licensing purposes.

The licensing regime is preventative. The issue is not limited to whether a crime was ultimately recorded. The relevant issue is whether the premises and its immediate external environment were associated with disorder, risk, public fear, police demand, possible weapons concerns and potential harm.

Police submit that the 9 April incident was a clear warning sign. It involved multiple emergency calls, reports of a large fight, possible weapons, possible gunshots, objects being thrown, vehicles being struck, ambulance consideration and significant concern from members of the public.

That incident should have prompted the premises licence holder to review its security provision, external area control, event risk assessment, dispersal arrangements, CCTV monitoring, vehicle access arrangements and liaison with police. Despite that warning, within approximately three weeks the premises were associated with a far more serious incident involving suspected firearm discharge.

7 Police Intelligence

Annex 14 – part C - Intel URN 01/6193974/26 - Following the incident on 1 May 2026, police conducted checks of relevant police systems to identify whether there was any wider information relevant to the premises, the event, and the promotion of the licensing objectives.

Police identified intelligence linked to CAD 10074/01MAY26 and CAD 10167/01MAY26. The intelligence alleges that during a boxing event at the Selby Centre on 1 May 2026 unlawful activity was taking place and that people connected with the event and/or security provision were aware of that activity. The intelligence further alleges that, following the shooting incident, an injured person was removed from the scene rather than emergency services being immediately contacted.

Annex 15 - Part C 0- Intel URN Intel URN 01/6192783/26 Police identified intelligence which states that police have been called to North Middlesex Hospital to reports of a male with stab wound injuries. Police have then been made aware that the victim and that this has been linked to an incident whereby there has been a shooting.

8. Management and Control Concerns

Police have serious concerns regarding the management and control of the premises.

The risk to the general public was high due to the incident occurring in a near community centre and firearms/weapons being used. It is possible that similar incident could occur as the propensity to commit this violence has already been shown. The risk is heightened by the fact the premises have no dispersal police, no risk assessment, no weapons prevention policy in place, no incident preservation policy. It is clear that vehicle access and egress were uncontrolled, the premises had no effective control over the enclosed car park and external areas and SIA staff deployed were not in sufficient numbers in appropriate locations.

Police submit that the circumstances of the incident reveal a failure of control. The concern is not simply that serious crime occurred, but that the premises environment appears to have allowed the incident to develop, continue and conclude without sufficient intervention.

Enquiries into SIA personnel on duty that night reveal acting on information provided by the DPS that at the time of the incident according to the SIA Booking log only 3 personnel were on duty with two others arriving at 2330 hours after the incident. Details of a 6th SIA personnel member was provided by the DPS to Police as being on duty that night, however the SIA log does not reflect this person's details. This is a discrepancy.

9. Analysis of Contributing Factors

9.1 External area and car park control

The 1 May incident appears to have taken place in and around the car park and associated external areas. These areas form part of the premises environment and are directly relevant to the licensing objectives.

Where licensed premises permits patrons, guests, vehicles or event attendees to use external areas, those areas must be properly managed. External areas can become flashpoints for disorder, weapons, vehicle-related crime, congregation, intimidation and escape from the scene.

9.2 Vehicle access and egress

The CAD and CCTV evidence indicate that vehicles were closely linked to the incident. Vehicle access may not have been subject to sufficient control. Vehicles connected to licensed premises events can be used to transport suspects, victims, weapons or other items, and can also provide a means for people to leave before police arrive.

9.3 CCTV and active monitoring

CCTV appears to have been important in understanding what occurred. However, the issue for the licensing authority is not merely whether CCTV existed, but whether it was sufficient, properly positioned, actively monitored and capable of supporting real-time intervention.

9.4 Security deployment

The incident raises concerns as to whether security staff were present in the right locations, in sufficient numbers, and with a clear understanding of their duties. If the premises are to continue operating, police would expect the license holder to demonstrate a robust security plan covering internal areas, external areas, entrances, exits, car parks, vulnerable points, dispersal routes and emergency response.

9.5 Event risk assessment

Police invite the sub-committee to consider whether the event had been properly risk assessed by reference to expected attendance, nature of event, previous history, location, external risks, transport arrangements, likely congregation, alcohol availability, private hire arrangements and any intelligence or known risk.

9.6 Estate layout, gates, access and egress

Police have been provided with a separate location document containing aerial imagery, estate layout images and Google Street View images. That material shows the Selby Centre estate, the position of the premises within the wider estate, the access roads, gates, car park areas, and the area where the recent shooting is understood to have taken place. This material should be included within the review bundle as Annex B.

Police submit that the location material is relevant because it demonstrates that the incident did not occur in some remote or wholly unconnected place. The area concerned forms part of, or is immediately associated with, the premises environment and estate controlled by the Selby Trust / Selby Centre management.

The images show that while gates exist within the estate, access and egress are not physically restricted by a natural barrier or by a consistently controlled security presence. In practical terms, vehicles and people appear able to enter, leave, move around, gather and use relevant parts of the estate without sufficient restriction, challenge or supervision.

Police submit that this is central to the licensing risk. The incident on 1 May 2026 involved vehicles entering and leaving the estate, males moving around the car park area, persons taking cover behind vehicles, blood being located at the scene, cartridge casings being recovered and ammunition being found. The lack of effective control over access and egress is therefore not a peripheral matter. It goes directly to public safety and the prevention of crime and disorder.

The premises licence holder and those responsible for the estate must be able to demonstrate effective control of the whole premises environment used by patrons, guests, event organizers, vehicles and security. This includes gates, car parks, internal estate roads, external congregation areas and any route by which persons or vehicles can enter or leave during events.

Police have submitted that the current arrangements are inadequate. If the licence is not revoked, any continuation of licensable activity would require enforceable conditions requiring a written estate control plan, controlled gate management, SIA deployment at access and egress points, vehicle logs, active CCTV monitoring and a clear prohibition on unmanaged vehicle movement during events.

10. Response to Premises Licence Holder / DPS Points of Dispute

Police have considered the response sent by Unique West-Alese on behalf of the Selby Trust following service of the expedited review / interim steps notification. The response disputes several phrases used in the police paperwork. Police address the points below. The police position is that the response does not undermine the statutory basis for this review and does not answer the central licensing concern: that the premises and its immediate operating environment were associated with serious crime and serious disorder, and that existing management controls were insufficient to prevent or mitigate that risk.

Police do not ask the sub-committee to determine criminal guilt against any individual. The issue for the sub-committee is a licensing one: whether the license holder can promote the licensing objectives, particularly the prevention of crime and disorder and public safety. The summary review provisions under section 53A are engaged where the premises are associated with serious crime and/or serious disorder. The test is not limited to whether the firearm was physically discharged inside the licensed area, nor whether the injured persons were proven paying customers. The licensing assessment properly includes the premises, events, car park, gates, access and egress points, external areas used by attendees, and the wider premises environment where those matters bear upon the licensing objectives.

The Home Office statutory guidance issued under section 182 of the Licensing Act 2003 makes clear that licensing authorities should look to the police as the main source of advice on crime and disorder. Police submit that the CAD evidence, intelligence, CCTV observations, hospital-linked injury, blood trail, cartridge casings, possible ballistic strike and recovered ammunition provide the evidential basis for the police concerns.

10.1 Status of the police material: representation, not a final evidential report

The DPS describes the police material as an officer's "report". Police clarify that the material served for the expedited review is a police representation and review application material prepared for the purposes of the Licensing Act 2003 summary review process. It is not a final criminal investigation report, nor is it intended to replace the evidential file in any criminal proceedings.

The statutory test at this stage is not whether every criminal allegation has been proved to be of the criminal standard. The issue for the licensing sub-committee is whether the premises are associated with serious crime, serious disorder, or both, and what steps are appropriate and proportionate for the promotion of the licensing objectives. The representation therefore properly draws upon CAD entries, police observations, CCTV enquiries, hospital-linked information, scene findings, intelligence and licensing risk assessment.

10.2 Allegation of factual inaccuracies and "assertions"

The DPS states that the representation contains factual inaccuracies and "assertions". Police do not accept that characterization. The representation identifies the source and nature of the police concern: linked CADs, reports from security, independent callers, an off-duty police witness, hospital-linked injury information, blood at the scene, cartridge casings, suspected ballistic damage and recovered ammunition. Those matters are evidential and risk-based matters properly capable of consideration in licensing proceedings.

Where there is a factual distinction capable of being drawn, such as whether shots were discharged from within the car park or from the public right of way into the car park, police have addressed that distinction. It does not undermine the police case. On either version, the premises environment, estate access, car park, gate and event location were directly connected to a firearms incident. The premises were therefore associated with serious crime and serious disorder for the purposes of section 53A.

10.3 Allegation that the representation is inconsistent or speculative.

Police do not accept that the representation is inconsistent or speculative. The police case is deliberately framed around what the available material shows and the reasonable licensing risks that flow from it. The case is not dependent upon one witness, one CAD, or one assumption. It is supported by multiple linked calls and a sequence of corroborative material.

The representation is careful to distinguish between established CAD entries, police observations, physical scene findings, intelligence, and police assessment. Where material is intelligence or has not yet been tested in criminal proceedings, the representation says so. That is not speculation. It is a proper and transparent licensing assessment of risk.

10.4 Allegation that the material was compiled hastily and without sufficient rigor

The DPS suggests that the police material was compiled hastily and without sufficient rigor. Police reject that criticism. Summary reviews under section 53A are, by design, urgent protective proceedings. The legislation exists precisely because serious crime and serious disorder may require immediate licensing intervention before the full criminal investigation is complete.

The police material has been produced from contemporaneous CAD records, linked incident material, scene updates, CCTV enquiries, hospital-linked information and police licensing assessment. Any suggestion that the material lacks rigor is not supported by the volume and consistency of the underlying material. The fact that the Police representation was prepared promptly reflects the statutory urgency of the summary review process, not a lack of care.

10.5 DPS assertion that each point will be challenged with evidence

The DPS states that she intends to challenge each point with evidence. Police welcome any relevant evidence that assists the sub-committee. However, the DPS response presently does not provide the kind of operational evidence that would reassure police or the licensing authority that the premises can safely promote the licensing objectives.

In particular, the response does not, on its face, provide a complete event risk assessment, event management plan, SIA deployment plan, gate and car park control plan, CCTV monitoring log, incident log, radio log, dispersal plan, or clear evidence identifying who had real-time operational control of the estate, gates, external areas and car park at the material time. Nor does it explain what concrete preventative measures were taken after the significant disorder incident on 9 April 2026 to prevent escalation at future events.

10.6 Police position on the DPS response and DPS responsibilities

A DPS has a central role in the day-to-day promotion of the licensing objectives. The police concern is that the DPS response seeks to narrow the issue to whether the firearm was discharged from a public right of way, rather than addressing the broader licensing question: why the premises environment, during or around an event, was vulnerable to serious disorder and firearm-related violence, and why existing controls failed to prevent or contain that risk.

Police submit that the DPS response largely challenges wording and attribution but does not adequately confront the substance of the licensing concern. The core issue is not whether the premises licence holder personally caused the firearm discharge. The core issue is whether the licensed premises and their wider operating environment were associated with serious crime and disorder, and whether the

license holder and DPS had effective systems in place to prevent, deter, manage and respond to such risk.

The police position remains that the available evidence shows a serious escalation from the 9 April disorder incident to the 1 May firearms incident. The response from the DPS does not provide sufficient reassurance that the premises can continue to operate without undermining the prevention of crime and disorder and public safety objectives.

10.7 “In the car park directly” / “gunshots fired within the enclosed car park”

DPS disputes any suggestion that the firearm was discharged inside the car park and asserts that shots were fired from the public right of way into the car park. Police can, if necessary, refine the wording to avoid any ambiguity: the police case is that the incident involved shots fired into or towards the Selby Centre car park / premises environment, with persons and vehicles inside or associated with that environment. CAD 10074 records that eleven casings were found outside the fenced area where the vehicle had been parked, and that a van in the car park appeared to have a bullet hole in a window, with potentially ballistic material inside. Whether the discharge occurred from the road entrance/public right of way or within the car park, the licensing relevance remains the same: the premises environment was associated with a firearms discharge, persons connected to the scene were in the car park, and the existing access, egress, gate and security arrangements did not prevent the incident or contain the risk.

10.8 “A male from the gathering” / persons attending the event

The DPS states there is no evidence that individuals, including the victims, were attending the event. Police do not rely solely on proving that the injured male was a paying attendee or invited guest. The police evidence is that the injured male stated he had been at the Selby Centre, that vehicles connected to the incident entered and left the Selby Centre environment, and that the physical scene, blood trail, casings and CCTV enquiries all link the incident to the premises environment. Even if the sub-committee were to find that the injured people were not formal event attendees, the premises can still be associated with serious crime and disorder where people use, enter, target, congregate around, or move through the premises environment in connection with an event or activity at the premises.

10.9 “Firearm in a public car park” / public right of way

The DPS asserts that the firearm came from a public right of way. Police do not accept that this removes the licensing concern. The public right of way and the car park/access route formed part of the practical operating environment of the premises. The issue is whether the premises license holder had sufficient control measures in place to manage foreseeable risk at events, including gate control, SIA deployment, vehicle access, CCTV monitoring, external area supervision and safe dispersal. A firearm being discharged from a public right of way into the premises environment is not exculpatory. It is a powerful demonstration that the premises and their access points were vulnerable to serious violence.

10.10 “The premises were subjected to a serious crime, not associated with it”

Police disagree. The language of section 53A concerns premises associated with serious crime or serious disorder. Association is broader than culpability. Police are not required to prove that the license holder committed the crime or intended it. The relevant question is whether the premises, its event, its car park, its gates, its access/egress routes or its operating environment related to the serious crime/disorder in a way that engages the licensing objectives. Here, the initial emergency report came from the head of security at the Selby Centre; vehicles were seen leaving the Selby Centre; the injured male stated he had been at the Selby Centre; blood and ballistic evidence were in the premises environment; and the incident followed a recent linked disorder incident on 9 April 2026. Police submit that the association is clear.

10.11 “Nothing to do with the licensed area”

The DPS states that the incident had nothing to do with the licensed area. Police submit that this is too narrow a reading of the licensing objectives. Licensed premises do not operate in a vacuum. The management of events necessarily includes arrivals, departures, external congregation, car parks, gates, access routes and dispersal. Where the premises license holder or Selby Trust controls or manages the wider estate, or permits event-related use of that estate, failures in those areas are relevant to the licensing objectives. The recent location evidence shows gates and an estate layout where access and egress were not effectively restricted by natural barriers or SIA control. This is directly relevant to public safety and the prevention of crime and disorder.

10.12 “The two victims exited the vehicle and were shot at from off-site”

Even on the DPS version, the incident remains directly relevant to the review. It means that persons within or immediately connected to the premises environment were targeted by firearm discharge from nearby. That raises acute concerns about how vehicles were permitted to enter, park, turn, wait and leave; how gates and access points were supervised; how external areas were monitored; and how the premises assessed risks for the event. The contention that shots were fired from off-site does not answer the core licensing concern: the premises environment was the target area and the incident generated risk to people at or around the premises.

10.13 PLH informed promptly and attended on the night

Police note the DPS position that the premises license holder was informed promptly and attended. That does not resolve the licensing concern. Attendance after the incident may be a relevant fact, but it does not demonstrate that adequate preventative systems were in place beforehand. The sub-committee is concerned about whether the premises were being managed to prevent crime and disorder and promote public safety. The existence of a serious firearms incident, after a recent large disorder incident on 9 April, suggests that the preventative controls in place were insufficient.

10.14 “Clear lines of control and delegation”

The DPS asserts that clear lines of control and delegation existed. Police invite the sub-committee to test that assertion against the evidence. If clear lines of control existed, the premises should be able to produce, for the relevant event, a named duty manager, event management plan, SIA deployment plan, car park/gate control plan, CCTV monitoring plan, incident log, radio log, risk assessment, dispersal plan and evidence of who had operational responsibility for the car park and external estate. The police concern is that the incident revealed either a lack of sufficient control or a lack of effective implementation of that control.

10.15 “Systems and processes were in place”

The DPS states that systems and processes were in place and that immediate action was taken. Police submit that the mere existence of systems is not enough. Licensing is concerned with effective systems. The 9 April incident generated multiple emergency calls involving disorder, possible weapons and possible gunshots. Within three weeks, the premises were associated with a firearms incident involving injury, blood, cartridge casings and ammunition. That sequence strongly suggests that any systems in place were either insufficient, inadequately implemented, or incapable of controlling the risks associated with events and the wider premises environment.

10.16 “Speculative rather than evidential”

Police do not accept that the representation is speculative. The police case relies on multiple CADs, independent callers, a report from the head of security, an off-duty police officer witness, hospital-linked injury, CCTV enquiries, a blood trail, recovered casings, possible ballistic damage to a van and

recovered ammunition. Some material is intelligence and is identified as such. Police are careful not to ask the sub-committee to determine criminal guilt. However, credible intelligence and police risk assessment are relevant in licensing proceedings, especially in a preventative regime concerned with serious crime, disorder and public safety.

10.17 Overall response to the DPS challenge

The DPS response focuses heavily on whether the firearm was discharged from a public right of way rather than inside the car park, and whether the injured persons were proven attendees. Those points do not defeat the police case. The licensing concern is broader and more serious: the Selby Centre premises environment was the location of, or directly connected to, a firearms incident; the premises had already been linked to significant disorder three weeks earlier; gates and estate access were not effectively controlled; and the existing arrangements did not prevent persons and vehicles connected with serious violence from using or targeting the premises environment. Police submit that the DPS response does not provide sufficient reassurance that the licensing objectives can be promoted by the license continuing in its present form.

11. Police Outcome Sought

Police seek revocation of the premises license.

The Selby Centre was linked to significant disorder on 9 April 2026. That incident involved multiple emergency calls, reports of large groups fighting, possible weapons, possible gunshots, objects being thrown and public fear. Within approximately three weeks, the premises were then associated with a serious firearms incident involving suspected firearm discharge, injury, blood at the scene, multiple casings, possible ballistic damage and recovered ammunition.

Police submit that the licensing authority cannot have confidence that the premises can safely operate under the current license. The police position is that the licensing objectives, particularly the prevention of crime and disorder and public safety, cannot be promoted by the continuation of the license. Revocation is therefore appropriate and proportionate.

Location, Estate Control, Gates and Access/Egress Evidence – (Annex 16 -part C)

This annex is to contain the separate location document referred to within the body of the representation, including aerial imagery, estate layout images and Google Street View images showing the Selby Centre estate, the premises, access roads, gates, car park areas and the area where the recent shooting is understood to have taken place.

Police rely upon this material to show the physical relationship between the licensed premises, the wider estate, the car park and the incident location. Police also rely upon the material to demonstrate that although gates exist, access and egress are not adequately restricted by natural barriers or consistently controlled SIA security, creating a risk that persons and vehicles can enter, leave and move around the estate without sufficient control.

Images / plans to insert:

- Aerial view of Selby Centre estate.
- Aerial view marking the licensed premises and wider estate boundaries.
- Street View showing estate access points and gates.
- Image showing car park / area where shooting is understood to have taken place.

Metropolitan Police Service - Police Licensing Representation

Image showing access and egress routes used by vehicles and pedestrians.

Kind regards,

Submitted on behalf of Central Strategic Delivery Unit (SDU) Licensing

Police Constable Adriana Costache

Metropolitan Police Service

Date: 26th of May 2026